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INTRODUCTION
In Against Prosecutors, Professor Bennett Capers discusses domestic
violence, among other crimes, to propose reforming our current system of public
prosecution in favor of a model in which the victim could decide whether to
pursue a criminal case and what punishment (if any) her assailant would receive.1
He invokes the spirit of private prosecution, including the imposition of peace
bonds on wife-beaters in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,2 not to
“idealize or romanticize the past,” but “to show that the public prosecutor, a
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* Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. Thanks to Ben Levin to helping
conceive and organize this Symposium, my fellow contributors for sharing their ideas, and Bennett
Capers for writing an interesting and thought-provoking article that challenged the rest of us to write in
response.
1. I. Bennett Capers, Against Prosecutors, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1561, 1587 (2020). Capers
also discusses giving greater sentencing discretion to juries. See id. at 1607
2. Id. at 1573-76. See id. 1592 & n.173 (mentioning “peace warrants,” which required the
accused to post bond to refrain from certain misconduct, such as wife abuse, in the future).
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‘historical latecomer,’ is not inevitable.”3 In Capers’ view, restoring power to
victims might reduce or eliminate the prosecution of victimless offenses and the
punitive emphasis on incarceration, while facilitating justice for crimes like rape
that District Attorney’s offices too often fail to pursue.4
My Essay focuses on domestic violence and concurs with Capers that
modern approaches to prosecuting the perpetrators of intimate-partner assault
and homicide are unsound. State actors tend to ignore the reasons victims do not
cooperate with the criminal legal system, as well as to impose one-size-fits-all
sentences that are ill-suited to some victim-offender relationships and
detrimental to marginalized communities. Capers also notes insightfully that
victims may find validation without retributive punishment of the offender, or
they may prefer less punishment than the state would impose. The assumption
that the state knows best actually leads to the erasure of the victim. 5 Despite
Capers’ sensitivity to racial issues, however, he pays insufficient attention to the
social context and relationship dynamics constraining the decisions of intimatepartner abuse survivors, which leads him to place too much faith in private
prosecution as a remedy.
Capers’ appeal to the past also oversimplifies it in a risky way. First, the
old model of private prosecution was imperfect and could never be grafted onto
the modern criminal legal system, for it had its origins in a time before the rise
of defense counsel, complex evidence rules, the accused’s right to silence, and
professional police.6 To his credit, Capers acknowledges this limitation, but it
makes his project more of a thought experiment than a concrete proposal.
Second, with specific regard to domestic violence, private prosecution did not
differ as radically as one might expect from the public model that replaced it in
the second half of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth.
Lack of scholarly attention to the history of domestic violence sustains the
misperception that the state swung from tolerance to mandatory intervention
without any intermediate stance. In fact, both the Victorians and the Progressives
tried to punish and prevent wife-beating during a period that I call “the long
nineteenth century.” These efforts continued into the 1930s and 1940s, and their
ineffectiveness is instructive.

3. Id. at 1573 n.72. See id. at 1573 (“The goal is not to pay obeisance or offer blind fealty to
our forebears by suggesting we adopt whole cloth their system of private prosecution.”).
4. See id. at 1588-1604.
5. See id. at 1583-84, 1587, 1591-92, 1596-99, 1603 n.227, 1608 & n.262.
6. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 2-4, 10-66, 253
(2003) [hereinafter LANGBEIN, ORIGINS] (describing English criminal procedure from the sixteenth
century to the early eighteenth century); Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of
the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086 (1994). Moglen states
that “a small cadre of lawyers” managed a large number of prosecutions in colonial America, but he
refers primarily to major public order offenses, such as riots. Moglen at 1110. Victims prosecuted runof-the-mill cases like assault and battery in British North America. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency
and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 912 (2006).
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Women’s use of the criminal law to interrupt violence without the goal of
imprisoning their abusers shaped both private prosecution in the early days of
the republic and state intervention during the long nineteenth century. Even after
public prosecutors began to argue that the People, not the victim, charged the
abusive husband with assault,7 beaten wives routinely got their assailants
detained and reprimanded; then, they often sought to have their cases dismissed.
Yet the reasons survivors wanted to avoid the severe punishment of the men who
assaulted them reveal a central fact that the mechanics of prosecution obscure:
the social context of domestic violence constrains victims’ choices.
Because domestic violence is a social problem, it needs a multifaceted
solution in which the identity of the prosecutor plays a relatively small role.
While creative approaches, including restorative justice and revamped batterer
intervention programs, have the potential to foster healing and acceptance of
responsibility without contributing to mass incarceration, there is danger in
encouraging victims to navigate their own cases. At best, private prosecution
would promote survivor autonomy. But, at worst, it might leave vulnerable
individuals to their own devices in a complex legal system. Anticipating this
objection, Capers responds that “prosecutor-advocates” provided by the state or
funded by NGOs could help victims with their cases.8
His proposed reform might nevertheless return domestic violence policy to
the bad old days when the government reluctantly accepted the woman’s
decision “to let the matter go” without doing anything further to protect her or
foster her independence.9 Putting the burden to prosecute on domestic violence
victims, or even allowing them to veto public prosecutorial decisions,
individualizes the harm they experience in a way that allows society and the state
to avoid responsibility for devising structural remedies. 10 In my view,
socioeconomic programs offering job training, housing, child care, and other
services that help those subject to intimate-partner abuse get on their feet,

7. For example, the public prosecutor of a domestic assault case in Los Angeles, California,
during the 1880s stated that the victim “is not here, prosecuting, but simply as a witness for the People,
and she was compelled to attend, by process of law.” Reporter Transcript, Preliminary Examination,
People v. Toal, No. 4211, at 84-5, L.A. City Justice’s Court, June 1, 9, and 23-25, 1885, Los Angeles
Area Court Records, 1850-1910, Huntington Library. The Toal case will be discussed in detail in my
book, HOUSES OF PAIN: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND LEGAL INTERVENTION IN THE UNITED STATES,
1870-1994 (Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming).
8. Capers, supra note 1, at 1588-89.
9. Id. at 1589. For discussion of dismissals due to the victim’s refusal to prosecute in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see infra notes 12-18, 49, and accompanying text. See also Laurie S.
Kohn, What’s So Funny about Peace, Love, and Understanding? Restorative Justice as a New
Paradigm for Domestic Violence Intervention, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 517, 549 (2010) (“The creation
of a separate, less-formal system for domestic violence cases seems eerily similar to the diversion of
cases from the criminal justice system that preceded the current system.”).
10. See Ben Levin, Victims’ Rights Revisited, 13 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 30, 37-38 (2022). See
also Jenia I. Turner, Victims as a Check on Prosecutors: A Comparative Assessment, 13 CALIF. L. REV.
ONLINE 72, 75 (2022) (stating that European countries that give crime victims’ veto power over
prosecution confine it “to offenses that are believed to offend particularly private interests”).

48

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW ONLINE SYMPOSIUM

[Vol. 13:45

whether they separate or remain in the intimate relationship, have more to offer
than returning to a model of private prosecution that was deeply flawed in its
own time. One might respond that socioeconomic programs and private
prosecution need not be mutually exclusive. However, this Essay contends that
a variety of concerns—including batterers’ recidivism and ability to turn private
prosecution into a malicious tool of coercion and control over resource-poor
victims—make the continued involvement of the public criminal legal system
advisable.
Even if private prosecution were established for some offenses without a
complete dismantling of the public approach, devils lurk in the details of how
this hybrid would work in the context of domestic violence. Capers suggests, for
example, that there are some types of domestic violence cases for which the state
should remain the primary decision-maker;11 yet drawing the line between those
best served by private versus public prosecution is no easy task. Intimate-partner
homicide victims clearly cannot prosecute their own murders. Aside from that
obvious distinction, though, who would determine which offenses warrant public
prosecution—and on what basis? Are some domestic violence crimes such
grievous offenses against the public that they require the state to assume a
stronger expressive and deterrent posture? Or would public prosecutors simply
take cases from victims who want to delegate them?
Although I embrace the importance of listening to the experiences and
preferences of intimate-partner abuse survivors, I believe that caution would be
imperative—in both theory and practice—when designing a more victim-centric
criminal legal system. This Essay ultimately concludes that offering restorative
justice programs backed by criminal justice resources and consequences for noncompletion or recidivism might achieve the right balance.
I.
A BRIEF, UNEXPECTED HISTORY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTION
Consider these four moments in the prosecution of domestic violence in
American legal history:
(A) George Ausby, a habitual wife-beater, spent a short time in jail
in antebellum Philadelphia when his wife made an assault-andbattery complaint to a city alderman. Ausby had been ordered
to pay $300 to keep the peace against her, but he could not
afford to post bond, so he was jailed instead. The carceral
punishment in this case, which occurred in the informal world
of “primary justice” before the rise of full-time public
prosecutors, was somewhat unusual because “most women
only wanted to scare their husbands not to put them in prison.”
Hence, domestic violence prosecutions initiated by private
citizens in Philadelphia commonly resulted in peace bonds paid
11.

Capers, supra note 1, at 1589, 1591.
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by the abusive husband.12
(B) In Los Angeles County, California, during the 1920s, Vernon
La Clear fired multiple bullets at his estranged wife Alysse. She
had left him because “he was brutal to [her] and constantly
upbraided [her] for things” she had not done. Fortunately, the
gunshot wounds he inflicted were superficial.13 Reluctant to see
Vernon incarcerated, Alysse went to jail three times to avoid
giving evidence against him. Her refusal to cooperate with the
public prosecutor led to multiple continuances of the
preliminary hearing and efforts by the District Attorney’s office
to depose her as a material witness before she could flee the
jurisdiction.14 Alysse apparently preferred to divorce Vernon
(with cruelty as the asserted grounds) than see him convicted.
15
He ultimately pleaded guilty to assault with a deadly weapon,
instead of assault with intent to commit murder, and was
sentenced to eight months in county jail—a milder punishment
than he might have received if Alysse had cooperated with
prosecutors.16 Although her refusal to assist the state was
typical of domestic violence victims in the late 1800s and early

12. ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 18001860, at 46-47, 69 (1989). By contrast to Philadelphia, early nineteenth-century New York courts often
ordered the incarceration of physically abusive husbands. Samuel Chipman reported in the 1830s that
three out of four inmates in one jail were wife-beaters. In Albany, the fraction was smaller, but nearly
one-quarter of the prisoners had been convicted of some kind of family abuse. See Jerome Nadelhaft,
Wife Torture: A Known Phenomena in Nineteenth Century America, 10 J. AM. CULTURE 39, 55 (1987)
(citing SAMUEL CHIPMAN, REPORT OF AN EXAMINATION OF POOR HOUSES, JAILS, &C, IN THE STATE
OF NEW YORK, AND IN THE COUNTIES OF BERKSHIRE, MASSACHUSETTS, LITCHFIELD, CONNECTICUT,
AND BENNINGTON, VERMONT, &C 76-77 (4th ed.1836)).
13. Shoots Wife and Himself, L.A. TIMES, March 4, 1922, at II1. The La Clear case and the next
example, involving defendant Richard King, will be discussed in my book, HOUSES OF PAIN, supra note
7.
14. Loyal Wife Could Not Block Case: Woman Who Was Shot Refuses to Testify, but Husband
is Held, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1992, at II10; Wife Sticks by Husband; Goes to Jail, L.A. TIMES, April 26,
1922, at II12. See Notice of Application to Take Testimony, May 12, 1922, and Application to Examine
Witness Conditionally, May 16, 1922, with supporting Affidavits of Deputy District Attorneys John J.
Hill, Jr., and Otto Eigholz, People v. La Clear, CR 18268 (1922), Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Cal., L.A County Records Archive (on file with author). See also Wife Shot, Now Asks for Divorce, L.A.
TIMES, May 13, 1922, at II1 (reporting contempt sanctions).
15. Family Turmoil is Ended: Mrs. La Clear, Whose Love Survived Five Bullets, Is Granted
Decree of Divorce, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1923, at II13; Wife Shot, Now Asks for Divorce, L.A. TIMES,
May 13, 1922, at II1. See Affidavit of Alysse La Clear in Behalf of Defendant, July 6, 1922, at 3-4,
People v. La Clear, CR 18268, Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Cal., L.A. County Records
Archive (stating, in an effort to get probation for her husband, that she
had provoked him very much” and that he “had always been kind and considerate” to her) (on file with
the author).
16. Register of Actions (recording guilty plea on July 7, 1922, and sentencing on July 21, 1922),
Complaint, March 6, 1922, and Information (recording charge), People v. La Clear, CR 18268, Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Cal., L.A. County Records Archive (on file with author). News reporting
indicates that he only served four months of his eight-month sentence. Family Turmoil is Ended, L.A.
TIMES, supra note 15.

50

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW ONLINE SYMPOSIUM

[Vol. 13:45

1900s, the government coercion she experienced was rarer.
(C) West Los Angeles architect Richard King avoided prosecution
for beating and kicking his spouse Janice in 1955. Fifteen
months earlier, Richard had shot Janice in the shoulder when
she filed for divorce. She obtained a restraining order after the
shooting but subsequently dropped her divorce petition and
returned to her husband. When that reconciliation failed, she
suffered another brutal assault and death threats that landed
Richard in criminal court.17 The new charges were also
dropped, though, because Janice said she did not want to
prosecute.18 The attitudes of police and prosecutors in the
1950s and 1960s were markedly less condemnatory of batterers
than they had been in the past. An era of conciliation and
victim-blaming that preceded feminist calls for mandatory state
intervention in domestic violence had begun.
(D) In 2002, Adrian Spraggins allegedly pushed and threatened his
girlfriend, Meredith Bell, who was scheduled to testify against
him in another domestic violence case. He then forced her and
her child into his car, and when she escaped in the parking lot
of her workplace, he chased and threatened to hit her.
Bystanders called the police, and Adrian was arrested and
charged with myriad crimes, including witness tampering,
under the mandatory arrest law and no-drop prosecution policy
in place in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Despite Meredith’s efforts
to get the charges against Adrian dismissed, she was forced to
give testimony at his witness-tampering trial. She recanted on
the stand, telling the court that she loved Adrian and “did not
want him to get into trouble.” He was convicted, even though
she claimed that her prior accusations were lies.19
Of these cases, only Example D—the twenty-first century case of Adrian
Spraggins and Meredith Bell—illustrates the system of mandatory interventions
in domestic violence that many progressive scholars criticize for ignoring the
priorities of abuse survivors, contributing to mass incarceration, and further
destabilizing poor, minority communities from which many batterers and their
victims come.20 No-drop prosecution constituted a reaction to the familiar
17. See Architect Accused of Beating Wife: Brentwood Man Was on Leave from Hospital after
Wounding Mate and Self Last Year, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1955, at 31.
18. See Architect Freed of Wife Beating Charge, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1955, at 5.
19. LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE; DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM 126-27 (2012) [hereinafter GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE]. See People v. Spraggins,
2003 WL 22971050 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (affirming Spraggins’ conviction).
20. See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of
Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2009) [hereinafter
Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism]; Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 748
(2007); Holly Maguigan, Wading into Professor Schneider’s “Murky Middle Ground” Between
Acceptance and Rejection of Criminal Justice Responses to Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 427, 443-44 (2003).
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scenario of state apathy and ignorance about the cycle of violence shown in the
1950s case (Example C).21 By contrast, Example B reveals a little-known aspect
of the history of public prosecution between the bygone days of private
prosecution (Example A) and the mandatory interventions that re-traumatized
Meredith Bell in 2002. The La Clear case in 1922 exemplifies frustrated
government efforts to curb domestic violence, including the occasional use of
contempt sanctions against reluctant complainants, during the late nineteenth
century and the first half of the twentieth.
A. Private Prosecution
Although private prosecution persisted into the antebellum era of U.S.
history, it was most typical of England and colonial America.22 Scholars differ
over whether the criminal law benefitted poor people during the early modern
period, but the most positive view holds that the ability of ordinary folk to bring
charges and exercise discretion over case outcomes—often reaching settlement
without a formal verdict—ensured that a wide range of social groups could use
the criminal law to protect their interests.23 Lay private prosecution occurred
both as part of “the accused-speaks” felony trial, in which neither side had
lawyers, and in the non-jury adjudication of minor offenses by nonprofessional
justices of the peace (JPs).24 Although English courts did not provide financial
assistance for victims to bring assault cases, the poor “were still extensively
involved in litigating these prosecutions.”25
Ordinary people could decide which charges to bring and whether to drop
the case, but it would be naïve to assume that their discretion was unaffected by
myriad pressures. Poverty and fear of retaliation by either the offender or the
community numbered among their concerns. The prosperity of a private

21. See Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism, supra note 20, at 11-12; G. Kristian Miccio, A House
Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s
Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 265-66 (2005).
22. See JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 6-8, 13
(1980); Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of ‘Public’ Prosecutors in Historical Perspective,
39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1325-26 (2001) [hereinafter Ramsey, Discretionary Power]. Pennsylvania,
which followed a slightly different course due to the influence of Dutch and Quaker settlers, had a
colonial tradition of settling minor disputes through arbitration and the posting of peace bonds or
sureties. See STEINBERG, supra note 12, at 7 (noting that Pennsylvania colonists were supposedly happy
because “they have no lawyers. Everyone is to tell his own case, or some friend for him.”).
23. PETER KING, CRIME, JUSTICE, AND DISCRETION IN ENGLAND, 1740-1820, at 354-61
(2000); STEINBERG, supra note 12, at 231; John H. Langbein, Albion’s Fatal Flaws, 98 PAST AND
PRESENT 96, 101, 105 (1983). But see Douglas Hay, Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law, in
ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 17, 26, 34-37, 4142, 48-49 (Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John G. Rule, E.P. Thompson, and Cal Winslow, eds., 1975)
(arguing that English criminal law overwhelmingly served as an “ideological instrument” of the ruling
class, even though the poor could also prosecute cases).
24. LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 6 at 11, 42, 99. See Moglen, supra note 6, at 1099, 110608, 1110
25. KING, supra note 23, at 41.
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prosecutor made it more likely that a criminal case would go to trial; 26 poor
victims often abandoned their prosecutions due to the money and time required
to gather evidence and appear in court. They might settle for the pre-trial
detention of the accused as an informal punishment or use completely extra-legal
alternatives—such as physical violence, social ostracism, and economic
sanctions—because they could not afford a full prosecution of the offense.27
The formal law provided authority to coerce private prosecutors into
appearing at trial. JPs could bind the victim by recognizance to continue the
prosecution or forfeit a sum of money, although in practice, judges tended to take
a lenient view of private prosecutors who failed to turn up in court or who asked
to drop their cases.28 Under English law, victims of property crime could actually
be convicted and punished for the offense of “compounding,” if they reclaimed
their goods or obtained other material satisfaction from the perpetrator to settle
the case.29 Hence, the early modern system of private prosecution was not free
from government coercion.
While the accused-speaks trial gradually began to disappear from ordinary
felony cases in the late eighteenth century, private citizens continued to
prosecute some criminal cases in the antebellum United States and even later. 30
Indeed, private and public prosecution coexisted for much of the nineteenth
century.31 One of the most carefully-researched jurisdictions to retain a system
of “primary justice” was Philadelphia, which historian Allen Steinberg has
described in detail. His discussion of how battered wives charged their husbands
with assault provides useful information to support the arguments in this Essay.32
Private prosecution of domestic assault in Philadelphia during the early
nineteenth century was little more than fee-based arbitration. Victims or other
private citizens, such as neighbors who witnessed a husband beating his wife,
could bring cases to city aldermen.33 Philadelphia aldermen often settled cases
without a jury, even the indictable offenses that formal criminal procedure
required them to transfer to courts of record. Indeed, crimes against the person

26. Id. at 36-37, 44-45. Nevertheless, King emphasizes that criminal justice was not reserved
for the gentry, clergy, or other elites. See id. at 357.
27. Id. at 22-30, 44-45.
28. Id. at 43-44. In antebellum Philadelphia, Grand Juries often dismissed cases “for
unwillingness of persons to prosecute.” This led to an effort to curb weak or malicious cases and lack of
follow-through by charging private prosecutors a fee if the Grand Jury did not return a true bill.
STEINBERG, supra note 12, at 84-85. Roger Fairfax and Jenia Turner both note the potentially positive
role of Grand Juries in curbing overzealous public prosecution and suggest the superiority of that
approach to a private model. See Roger Fairfax, For Grand Juries, 13 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 20, 2627 (2022); Turner, supra note 10, at 83.
29. KING, supra note 23, at 24.
30. See STEINBERG, supra note 12, at 1-2, 38 (1989). See also Moglen, supra note 6, at 112435 (stating that many aspects of English criminal procedure persisted after the Founding).
31. Ramsey, Discretionary Power, supra note 22, at 1325-31.
32. See STEINBERG, supra note 12 , at 46-47, 68-69.
33. Id. at 46.
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were more likely to be resolved out of court than property offenses were.34
Battered women who pursued their complaints in courts of record, rather than
settling for a peace bond, seem to have desired the conviction of their abusers,
which they obtained in more than 70 percent of cases resulting in indictment.
Victims of the most serious assaults and those who had already separated from
their abusive husbands were “usually willing to let the law take its course and
have the man sentenced to prison.” However, many others stopped short of
seeking carceral punishment and begged the judge for leniency instead.35
Steinberg believes that primary justice offered “a source of individual
power with state backing that was employed by one citizen against another, not
a source of state power that was extended over the citizenry in general by an
external . . . authority.”36 Ordinary working-class people could usually afford the
small fees associated with this system; it was accessible, and it leant their cases
seriousness and legitimacy. 37
However, corruption and malicious prosecution sometimes occurred. Most
relevant to problem of domestic violence, primary aggressors could easily lodge
cross-complaints to manipulate and harass their victims. Critics of private
prosecution in Philadelphia pointed out that this arrangement meant “a
quarrelsome drunkard, having beaten his wife, proceeds at once to the magistrate
and charges her, on oath with assault and battery, or with assault and threats, and
the poor woman comes down to the prison with her head bruised, her eyes
blackened . . . “38 Primary justice, then, did not avoid the problem of dual arrests
that persists today, and if private prosecution were reinstituted, fear of retaliation
might constitute an even greater impediment to justice for domestic violence
survivors than it currently does.39
Moreover, the relief that battered women accepted when they brought their
own cases in the past—an interruption of the violence, combined with a
reprimand to the abusive man and an order that he provide a peace bond, pay a
fine, or serve a brief jail term—was satisfactory only within these survivors’
socially-constrained circumstances. Historically, women lacked the ability to
obtain well-paying jobs and affordable childcare; they could divorce only at
considerable expense for limited reasons and faced social stigma for doing so.
Safely leaving a formal marriage or common-law relationship and providing for
their children on their own was very difficult.40 Further, abused women often

34. Id. at 41, 54, 61
35. See id. at 55, 69, 262 n.42.
36. Id. at 55.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 53.
39. Corey Rayburn Yung raises a similar objection to the private prosecution of rape in his
contribution to this Symposium. See Corey Rayburn Yung, Private Prosecution of Rape, 13 CALIF. L.
REV. ONLINE 86, 89-90 (2022).
40. Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Exit Myth: Family Law, Gender Roles, and Changing Attitudes
Toward Female Victims of Domestic Violence, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 12-14, 20-25 (2013)
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blamed excessive drinking and averred that their spouses were good men when
sober because they faced retaliatory violence for invoking the full power of the
criminal law.41 Their routine pleas for leniency and non-custodial sentences for
their assailants must be seen in this light.
B. Public Prosecution
Change occurred at different times in various American cities and counties,
but beginning around the middle of the nineteenth century, an apparatus
composed of District Attorneys, salaried police magistrates, police departments,
and multiple tiers of correctional institutions replaced informal, fee-based
justice. Public and private prosecution coexisted in some states after the advent
of elected District Attorneys and professional police forces.42 And policeinitiated cases were still guided to some extent by the victim’s enthusiasm (or
lack thereof) for obtaining a conviction. The practice of requiring women to
swear out a complaint against their batterers—which persisted into the twentieth
century and has been sharply criticized in stock feminist discussions of domestic
violence43—constituted a holdover from the informal justice of the past and also
applied to other misdemeanors that had no police eyewitnesses.44
The new criminal legal system did not turn a blind eye to domestic violence,
however. Men’s abuse of women appeared in criminal court dockets and led to
the punishment of men of all races and social classes in the second half of the

[hereinafter Ramsey, The Exit Myth]; Carolyn B. Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention in
the American West and Australia, 86 INDIANA L.J. 185, 214-18 & nn.160, 163, 165, 166-67, 172 (2011)
[hereinafter Ramsey, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND STATE INTERVENTION]. See STEINBERG, supra note
12, at 69 (stating that “[b]ecause of their economic dependency,” battered women in early Philadelphia
sought to avoid the imprisonment of their abusive husbands).
41. Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention, supra note 40, at 215 & nn.164-65.
42. See STEINBERG, supra note 12, at 41, 54-55, 61. The office of an elected District Attorney
was established in New York in 1846, slightly earlier than in Pennsylvania, and New Yorkers made
firmer and more successful efforts to end private prosecution than critics in other states did. After the
organization of the Metropolitan Police, New York City officers exercised unofficial discretion to
discharge prisoners, and police magistrates could decline to hold a suspect to answer in the trial court.
Hence, police and prosecutors supplanted the victim’s role in pressing or dropping charges. Ramsey,
Discretionary Power, supra note 22, at 1327-31 & n.109. See STEINBERG, supra note 12, at 83 (stating
that the elected District Attorney became a public official in Philadelphia in 1850 but that private
prosecution survived past the mid-century mark).
43. A student comment from the 1990s favoring mandatory arrest raised the typical objection
that requiring a battered woman to make a sworn complaint to get her abuser arrested put her in further
danger. Michaela M. Hoctor, Comment: Domestic Violence as a Crime against the State: The Need for
Mandatory Arrest in California, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 643, 674-75 (1997).
44. Historically, a police officer could make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor that he
witnessed and for a felony if he had probable cause, even if he had not seen the crime occur. However,
the victim or an eyewitness needed to swear out a complaint about less serious offenses that the police
did not observe, so the alleged offender could be summoned to court or arrested on a warrant. The origins
of this procedure were not unique to domestic violence. Rather, they stemmed from a time, before the
advent of salaried police, when “people went to court to get warrants against others who had stolen from
or injured them, bringing constables or sheriffs along, for a fee. . .” ROGER LANE, MURDER IN AMERICA
103 (1997).
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nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth.45 It was openly discussed
in newspapers, as well as in the courtroom.46 Although the government
intervened in intimate relationships, the strength of its condemnation of batterers
and its willingness to defer to victim preferences fluctuated. Punishments for
men who assaulted their female intimate partners in the late 1800s and early
1900s showed continuity with the past: fines and short jail terms predominated.47
As probation systems developed, suspended sentences accompanied by such
conditions as the avoidance of liquor largely supplanted the old practice of
requiring the defendant to post a peace bond.48
The refusal of women to assist with the prosecution of their abusers
frustrated government efforts to hold these offenders accountable. Contempt
sanctions against reluctant complainants constituted the exception, not the rule.
Society denounced men’s violence against women, but prosecutors and courts
often deferred to battered wives’ expressed desire for the dismissal of charges—
letting the accused men go with only a reprimand or suspended sentence. 49
Despite the efforts of criminal law personnel, abusive husbands not infrequently
reoffended—sometimes beating their wives within days of their release.50 Men
who murdered their wives had sometimes been charged with violence against
these same women repeatedly in the past.51 Hence, we must be wary of claims

45. Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention, supra note 40, at 201 & n.85. See
Elizabeth Katz, Judicial Patriarchy and Domestic Violence: A Challenge to the Conventional Family
Privacy Narrative, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 379, 408 (2015).
46. Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention, supra note 40, at 202-203 & nn.93, 94,
96, 97. See Katz, supra note 45, at 381, 384, 387 (describing newspaper coverage of cases around the
U.S during the 1910s).
47. Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention, supra note 40, at 206-213. See
Katz, supra note 45, at 405-20 (discussing the prosecution and punishment of wife-beaters during in a
more limited time period).
48. Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention, supra note 40, at 202 & n.90, 215 n.165,
217 & n.178. See Katz, supra note 45, at 412 (noting the imposition of pledges to abstain from liquor
on wife-beaters); Ramsey, The Stereotyped Offender: Domestic Violence and the Failure of
Intervention, 120 PENN. ST. L. REV. 337, 352-53 & n.62 (2015) [hereinafter Ramsey, The Stereotyped
Offender] (describing similar conditions on the release of wife-beaters in the late 1800s and early 1900s).
Some courts continued to use peace bonds in wife-beating cases in the twentieth century. See DEL
MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 102 (1976).
49. See, e.g., The Inferior Courts: Wife-Beater on Probation, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1909, at II2
(probation); T.J. Williams Vents the Fumes of His Liquor Upon His Family—Indignant Wife is Merciful,
L.A. HERALD, Nov. 29, 1898, at 9 (suspended sentence); Police Court Cases: What Was Done by City
Justices Yesterday, L.A. HERALD, April 21, 1898, at 12 (suspended sentence); Beating His Wife, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 1889, at 4 (“[T]he woman put in an appearance and begged that her husband be allowed
to go home. [He] promised to behave himself and was dismissed.”).
50. For twentieth-century examples from my forthcoming book, see Wife-Beating Habit of
Mexican Broken, L.A. TIMES, April 19, 1930, at 6 (reporting a 90-day jail term for a Hispanic repeat
offender who violated the conditions of his suspended sentence by beating his wife again); Wife Beater
Serves Term; Beats Her Again; Is Jailed, CHICAGO DAILY TRIB., March 18, 1928, at 1 (stating that a
repeat offender would spend 100 days in the workhouse because he beat his wife immediately after
serving a sentence of the same length for a past beating).
51. For examples of the escalation of domestic violence to homicide in several eras of American
history, see Police Wait to Query Wife-Killer Suspect, BOSTON GLOBE, April 11, 1963, at 5 (reporting
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that history demonstrates the success of either public or private prosecution in
handling gender-based violence.52
Defendants found guilty of murdering their female intimates during the late
1800s and early 1900s typically received life sentences or the death penalty. 53
Severe sentencing was, to some extent, state theater designed to keep
transgressive men in check and announce that the domestic ideology of
respectable, white Americans would be strictly enforced. Murderers ordered to
prison for life might be paroled after relatively little time, and some death
sentences were commuted.54 However, unlike today, wife murderers often went
to the gallows or the electric chair.55
The overriding concern to control violent men, rather than to transform the
social conditions that trapped women in abusive relationships, constituted the
greatest failing of government intervention in domestic violence before the
Battered Women’s Movement of the late twentieth century. Wealthy, white
batterers, as well as racial minorities and the poor, numbered among the
defendants convicted and punished for wife-beating, 56 but all these prosecutions
a husband was suspected of killing his wife in the 1960s after an assault complaint that she filed “was
settled without court action”); Slaying of Wife Denied: Groves Guarded in Hospital, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
3, 1934, at A1 (stating that a domestic murder victim in the 1930s called the police when her husband
threatened her with a gun but then persuaded the officers not to arrest him); Guilty Plea Entered in Death
Case: Whittier Man Who Slew Wife Will Be Sentenced to Life Imprisonment, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1925,
at A6 (reporting that a murder victim in the 1920s feared her husband so much that she “appealed to the
police for protection and had a police guard for a time.”); Doomed to Death Says “Thank You,” L.A.
HERALD, April 30, 1910, at 9 (noting that a death-sentenced California wife killer in 1910 had a long
history of prior arrests for domestic violence); Wife Murder: Startling Domestic Tragedy in South San
Francisco, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 9, 1874, at 3 (reporting that a nineteenth-century California wife murderer
had been punished previously by the police court for “brutality” that left “physical marks” on his
spouse’s body).
52. But see Capers, supra note 1, at (arguing that concerns about “lawlessness and criminals run
amok” are refuted by what “history suggests”).
53. Carolyn B. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide: Gender and Crime Control, 1880-1920, 77 UNIV.
COLO. L. REV. 101, 141-56 (2006) [hereinafter Ramsey, Intimate Homicide]. For similarly severe
outcomes for male defendants who killed their female intimate partners in other common-law countries
during the 1800s and early 1900s, see MARTIN J. WIENER, MEN OF BLOOD: VIOLENCE, MANLINESS
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 164, 210 (2004); Carolyn Strange, Masculinities,
Intimate Femicide, and the Death Penalty in Australia, 1890-1920, 43 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 310, 31116 (2003).
54. It was not uncommon for state governors to commute life sentences to a shorter range and
for those same prisoners to be released before they had served the lower end of the new sentence.
Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 53, at 187 App. F (providing data for Denver and Arapaho
Counties in Colorado). See JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL
OF THE UNDERCLASS, 1890-1990, at 45, 47-48 (1993) (discussing the evolution of parole from
essentially a mode of pardoning prisoners to a system authorized by indeterminate sentence laws).
55. See e.g., Four Murderers Hanged, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 24, 1889 (reporting the
execution of four wife murderers in one day in New York County, NY). At the end of the twentieth
century, less than 12 percent of the men sentenced to death were convicted of murdering an intimate
partner. Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: A Study of Capital Murder in
the Post-Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1510 (1986).
56. Examples of affluent men prosecuted for domestic violence in Los Angeles County,
California, during the long nineteenth century include: Infelicity: Wife Beating Cases, Sept. 25, 1915,
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aimed at social control. Indeed, the arrest and prosecution of husbands who failed
to uphold their duties toward their families under prevailing standards of social
responsibility formed one piece of a larger state effort, beginning in the mid1800s, to mobilize the criminal law against the so-called “dangerous classes”57
and reinforce the power of the elites by punishing affluent men whose conduct
threatened the ideology that supposedly legitimized their privilege. 58
Arrest avoidance and non-prosecution policies did not become widespread
until the middle of the twentieth century when a Cold War version of domesticity
and psychological theories blaming women for provoking domestic violence and
excusing men for perpetrating it suffused American culture. In the 1950s and
1960s, battered women were encouraged to reconcile with their husbands, not to
divorce them and certainly not to get them charged with crimes. 59 The prevalent
view expressed optimism that family violence could be cured, and harmony
restored. The language of medicine—specifically, psychology and psychiatry—
that permeated the rhetoric and practices of family courts also affected the
criminal legal system’s handling of domestic violence in mid-century America.
Police officers developed their own methods of responding to “domestic
dispute” calls. A Los Angeles Police Department veteran interviewed in 1967
said he had learned to separate the couple, commiserate with the man, remind
the beaten wife that her husband was the breadwinner, and discourage her from
pursuing a course of action that would land him in jail.60 Officers believed that

L.A. TIMES, at II1 (insurance agent and “descendant of a family distinguished in railroad and military
affairs”); Doctor Takes Arrest Coolly, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1909, at II2 (retired physician); Forceful
Plea for Temperance: Says Husband Beat Her for Wetting Whistle, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 1909, at II2
(partner in engineering firm); Lawyer Shaw Guilty of Wife-Beating, L.A. TIMes, Oct. 25, 1901, at 10
(attorney); It Cost Him $50—Attorney Hayford’s Fine for Beating His Wife, L.A. HERALD, July 9, 1893,
at 7 (attorney); Brutal Assault Made By James Velsir on His Ex-Wife, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1889, at 3
(former City Councilman). See also Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention, supra note 40
at 201 & nn.85-86; Katz, supra note 45, at 408.
57. See STEINBERG, supra note 12, at 219-20, 222-23; Mike McConville & Chester Mirsky,
The Rise of Guilty Pleas: New York, 1800-1865, 22 J.L. & SOC’Y 443, 460 (1995); Ramsey,
Discretionary Power, supra note 22, at 1374 & n.355; Reva Siegel, “The Rule of Love:” Wife Beating
as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L. J. 2117, 2134, 2137-38 (1996) (1996).
58. Victorian values are often associated with top-down efforts by the middle class to correct
and control their supposed inferiors.. Nevertheless, people from a variety of social positions and
education levels embraced and were subject to expectations about proper gender roles. Hence,
respectability and un-respectability crossed class lines, and affluent men were punished for their
transgressions, too. See ROBERT L. GRISWOLD, FAMILY AND DIVORCE IN CALIFORNIA, 1850-1890:
VICTORIAN ILLUSIONS AND EVERYDAY REALITIES 39, 45, 65, 97 (1983); LANE, supra note 45, at 124;
Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention, supra note 40, at 201-02.
59. See J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE
OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 113-20, 129-37 (1997) (describing efforts of family
courts after World War II to heal “sick” marriages and curb divorce). The Cold War domestic ideology,
psychological theories of wife-beating, and the involvement of courts in marital reconciliation in the
mid-twentieth century will be analyzed in detail in my forthcoming book. HOUSES OF PAIN, supra note
7. See also Ramsey, The Exit Myth, supra note 40, at 14-15, 28-31.
60. Family Fights Tough and Messy, Say Police, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1967, at SF_C2, 4
(describing the tactics of Officer Garland Poe).
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alcohol almost always played a role and that “some trivial incident” ignited
tensions between “people [who] love each other sincerely.” Officially, they had
to “advise the man that if he hits the woman it’s a felony, and the woman can be
guilty of a misdemeanor if she hits the man.” However, they saw themselves
performing a role more akin to a chaplain than a law enforcer.61
During the last three decades of the twentieth century, public responses to
domestic violence again changed course. Feminist leaders who excoriated the
patriarchal state for condoning men’s abuse of their intimate partners eventually
succeeded in galvanizing the criminal legal system to adopt mandatory
interventions. Recent analyses posit that, even then, state action was motivated
by a law-and-order agenda that supplanted gender equality, anti-racism, antiauthoritarianism, and other grassroots feminist principles. 62 Yet, somewhat
paradoxically, it took the efforts of racially diverse coalitions of leftist advocates
to spur the government to mandate the arrest and prosecution of batterers,
whether individual victims favored this punitive approach or not.63
II.
ADDRESSING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
To be sure, women’s position in society has improved, though I show in
my forthcoming book that demands for gender equality slowly eroded the
paternalistic solicitude that provided at least minimal protection for the so-called
“weaker sex” until the mid-twentieth century.64 Anxiety about gender roles
contributed both to the policies of non-intervention in wife abuse against which
the Battered Women’s Movement campaigned and to increased willingness to
convict female defendants for responding to such abuse with force.65 The
popularization of feminist ideas and the spread of knowledge, rather than myths,
about domestic violence has corrected some of these deleterious trends over the
past 50 years. But many domestic violence victims, especially poor victims of
color, still face significant challenges and inequalities.

61.
62.

Id.
MARIE GOTTSHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 139, 144-53, 159-60, 163-64 (2006). See AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST
WAR ON CRIME: THE UNEXPECTED ROLE OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION IN MASS INCARCERATION 16-17,
59-66 (2020); Miccio, supra note 21, at 282-94.
63. See Mimi Kim, Dancing the Carceral Creep: The Anti-Domestic Violence Movement and
the Paradoxical Pursuit of Criminalization, 1973-1986, at 9-12 (unpublished ISSI Graduate Fellows
Working Paper Series 2013-14.70, School of Social Welfare, Univ. Cal. Berkeley, 2015) (on file with
the author).
64. RAMSEY, HOUSES OF PAIN, supra note 7.
65. Ramsey, The Exit Myth, supra note 40, at 4-6. This shift, which occurred in the middle of
the twentieth century, will be explored in detail in my forthcoming book. See Ramsey, HOUSES OF PAIN,
supra note 7.
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A. Mass Incarceration and Calls to End the Public Prosecution of
Batterers
A chorus of voices now criticizes the “legal feminists” or “dominance
feminists” who transformed the Battered Women’s Movement by allying with
state power and urging the criminal punishment of batterers.66 Nevertheless,
restoring private prosecution would be a strange panacea. To be sure, public
prosecution strips power from relatively powerless individuals; there is
substantial value in fostering the autonomy of abuse survivors. But, before we
ask public prosecutors (especially feminist Deputy District Attorneys who
genuinely want to end gender-based violence) to step away, we need to make
sure there is an adequate, fully-funded support system to step in. And before we
advocate “returning decision-making authority to victims of crime,”67 we need
to address the pressures that still shape domestic violence victims’ reluctance to
prosecute.
Concerns about racialized “mass incarceration” may deter some victims of
color from involving the criminal legal system, given a history of oppressive
law-enforcement interactions with their families and communities.68 However,
individuals serving sentences for domestic violence crimes do not comprise one
of the largest sectors of the prison population. In fact, dismissals and noncustodial sentences are still the most common outcomes for misdemeanor
domestic violence charges.69 Nor do racial-minority women speak with one
voice about how they want their cases to be handled. More than half of the
African American women in one study from the early 2000s favored the
prosecution of their batterers. Having suffered serious injury or being separated
from the alleged perpetrator increased their desire to see him convicted. 70 Yet,

66. GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 19, at 2-4; GRUBER, supra note 63, at
45-46; Kimberle Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally
About Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1456-57 (2012); Miccio, supra note
21, at 241-44, 293-94.
67. Capers, supra note 1, at 1593.
68. See, e.g., LEIGH GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A BALANCED
POLICY APPROACH TO INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 7, 21 (2018) [hereinafter GOODMARK,
DECRIMINALIZING]; Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and
Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1042-43 (2000) [hereinafter Coker, Shifting
Power]. See also BETH E. RICHIE, COMPELLED TO CRIME: THE GENDER ENTRAPMENT OF BATTERED
BLACK WOMEN 103 (1996) (attributing battered black women’s reluctance to turn to the criminal legal
system their isolation, which was exacerbated by police indifference, and to their fear of being punished
for law-breaking).
69. See Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 55 n.232 (“Only about a
third of convicted DV defendants get jail sentences; most get conditional discharges, which may include
requirements such as batterer intervention programs”). It is worth noting, though, that probation is a
“stepping stone” to incarceration if offenders violate their probation conditions. GOODMARK,
DECRIMINALIZING, supra note 68, at 149.
70. Arlene N. Weisz, Prosecution of Batterers: Views of African-American Women, 17
VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 19 (2002). Negative experiences with law enforcement and the popularization of
arguments made by Michelle Alexander in THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
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because black women face “the stereotype of being strong, angry, and more
masculine than White women” and because sociological research suggests they
do tend to use physical force to resist abuse, especially if they were exposed to
violence during childhood, they remain vulnerable to arrest and prosecution
themselves.71
Other factors besides racism have, for centuries, affected the attitudes of
domestic violence victims toward the criminal conviction of their tormentors.
These include economic dependence on the perpetrator, fear of his retaliation,
the challenges of raising children in common, and the belief that substance abuse,
mental illness, or past trauma lie at the heart of his violence. 72 Many of these
factors still disproportionately disadvantage racial groups that are among the
poorest in the United States; undocumented immigrants face the additional fear
of being deported.73 Despite the dedication of feminist advocates, or perhaps in
some instances because of the priority they placed on criminal prosecution,74 we
still have much work to do on these issues.
Legal scholars Donna Coker and Leigh Goodmark have suggested a
potential solution in community-based, transformative justice for abuse victims
and their families. Beyond seeking avenues outside the criminal legal system to
hold perpetrators accountable, they propose using the law to eliminate such
corollary harms as job loss, eviction from housing, and deportation that people
subject to intimate-partner abuse often suffer. Job training and other economic
programs would also help survivors leave violent relationships or gain autonomy
without separation.75 Coker argues that testing proposed laws and policies to
ensure they support victims with the fewest material resources would result in
superior reforms across the board.76
My goal here is not to revisit these proposals, which ambitiously envision
stabilizing poor communities of color by ending the vicious cycle whereby mass-

OF COLORBLINDNESS (revised ed., 2012) may have changed the attitudes of racial minority victims since

the publication of the Weisz study, however.
71. HILLARY POTTER, BATTLE CRIES: BLACK WOMEN AND INTIMATE PARTNER ABUSE 136
(2008) (naming the “dynamic resistance” of black women subject to intimate-partner abuse). Thirtythree of the 40 black female survivors of domestic violence in Potter’s study had been exposed to some
type of abuse during their childhoods. Of these 33, all but four “regularly fought back” against their
batterers as adults. Id. at 9, 126. See id. at 128-35 (recounting her interviewees’ stories about “fighting
back”).
72. See Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention, supra note 40, at 213-18.
73. See Coker, Shifting Power, supra note 68, at 1015-32; Zanita Fenton, Domestic Violence in
Black and White: Racialized Gender Stereotypes in Gender Violence, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 50
(1998).
74. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1857 (1996) (“[P]rosecutors must consistently
mandate participation, including testimony at trial, when necessary to proceed with a case. The societal
benefits gained through this criminal justice response to domestic violence far outweigh any short-term
costs to women’s autonomy and collective safety.”)
75. See GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING, supra note 68, at 41-47, 123-30.
76. See generally Coker, Shifting Power, supra note 68.
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or “hyper-incarceration” continuously reproduces contributors to gendered
violence: poverty, mental illness, substance abuse, toxic masculinities, and
racism.77 Unlike Coker, Goodmark, and an increasing number of progressive
scholars today, I do not favor the decriminalization of domestic violence.
Instead, I believe the energy of activists and academics is better directed toward
the reform of the criminal legal system in tandem with cultural and
socioeconomic initiatives to support victims and reintegrate offenders. Setting
aside the title of his article, Against Prosecutors, Capers and I seem to take a
similar view of this broader issue.
Disengagement from criminal justice approaches would be a mistake for
pragmatic reasons: the criminal law as an institution of governance is likely to
endure, whether legal academics and domestic violence experts turn away from
it or not.78 Rethinking—rather than abandoning—the criminal justice system is
the right approach with particular regard to domestic violence. While the
mandatory response of police and prosecutors has wrought more trouble than it
has alleviated,79 these actors still have important work to do. Their involvement
signals that the state strongly disapproves of the batterer’s behavior. The criminal
legal system can also continue to play a backup role to ensure compliance with
alternative processes like restorative justice (RJ).
I take as a given that mandatory arrest laws and “hard” no-drop prosecution
policies should be rescinded to allow greater discretion and victim input.
Although these measures seemed necessary in the late twentieth century to force
jaded police and prosecutors to take action even if abuse victims did not
cooperate, they have proven unsuccessful and overly rigid.80 Criminal law
personnel could better assist the abuse survivor by directing her to support
services and listening empathetically to her experiences and priorities when
making discretionary decisions about how to handle the case.81 Nevertheless,
evidence-based (also known as “victimless” or “soft no-drop”) prosecutions
likely will remain necessary in the foreseeable future for repeat offenders and
extreme violence.82

77. See Donna Coker & Ahjane Macquoid, Why Opposing Hyper-Incarceration Should be
Central to the Work of the Anti-Domestic Violence Movement, 5 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV.
585, 586-87, 597-98, 610-18 (2015).
78. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Criminal Justice for All, 66 J. LEGAL ED. 24, 27 (2016).
79. See Kohn, supra note 9 at 526-27 & nn. 32-33 (citing studies indicating that mandatory
arrest and no-drop prosecution increase victims’ vulnerability to re-abuse).
80. See GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 19, at 126-35; Maguigan, supra note
20, at 435.
81. See Bruce A. Green & Brandon P. Ruben, Should Victims’ Views Influence Prosecutors’
Decisions?, 87 BROOKLYN L. REV. 4, 35 (forthcoming 2022) (arguing that prosecutors generally should
consider “victims’ informed and reasoned preferences for non-prosecution and noncarceral resolutions”
in misdemeanor cases, not just with regard to domestic violence).
82. See GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 19, at 112 (defining “soft no-drop”).
Prosecutors would also continue to handle intimate-partner homicide cases.
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In the remainder of this essay, I focus on one potential improvement that
stops short of radically curtailing or eliminating public prosecution: using RJ
within the criminal legal system.
B. Restorative Justice
I have been a reluctant convert to the idea that RJ has the potential to
succeed in domestic violence cases where traditional criminal law interventions
have failed. Domestic violence differs from most situations in which RJ has led
to documented victim satisfaction and low rates of offender recidivism: juvenile
offenses and stranger crimes, such as robbery and burglary, perpetrated by
adults.83 Put simply, those subject to intimate-partner abuse may find themselves
pressured to participate in a process that is easily manipulated by batterers
because it centers on contrition—a recognized phase in the cycle of violence.84
Moreover, because domestic violence occurs in a social context, the assumption
that community-based initiatives are inherently superior to the criminal legal
system does not bear scrutiny.
Community-based programs may inappropriately privilege culture, race,
family loyalties, and other factors over gender.85 While scholars often assert that
the criminal legal system embodies racism,86 social control imposed by the
community (however defined) may not transcend various forms of bias,
including sexism. Pressure not to betray their racial identity, family, or sexual
orientation could dissuade victims from favoring the custodial punishment of
batterers or even the rigorous monitoring and enforcement of restitution
agreements that emerge from some RJ processes.87 Community participants
might turn the tables on the victim by suggesting her behavior provoked her
partner’s violence. Further, since coercive and controlling batterers often isolate
83. See Judge Bennett Burkemper & Nina Balsam, Examining the Use of Restorative Justice
Practices in Domestic Violence Cases, ST. LOUIS UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 121, 125-26 & n.33, 127 (2007).
84. See C. Quince Hopkins, Tempering Idealism with Realism: Using Restorative Justice
Practices to Promote Acceptance of Responsibility in Cases of Intimate Partner Violence, 35 HARV. J.
L. & GENDER 311, 317 (2012); Julie Stubbs, Domestic Violence and Women’s Safety: Feminist
Challenges to Restorative Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE 42, 58, 60
(Heather Strang & John Braithwaite, eds., 2002). See also Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for
Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 85-88 (1999) [hereinafter
Coker, Enhancing Autonomy] (discussing the risk that apology may be a form of “cheap justice” victims
are pressured to accept)
85. Stubbs, supra note 84, at 49, 53-54. See Coker, Enhancing Autonomy, supra note 84, at 44
(“Families cannot always be counted on to confront an abusive family member, however. Family
members may deny, minimize, and blame the victim for the batterer’s violence.”).
86. See GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING, supra note 68, at 99 (arguing that RJ should be kept
independent of the criminal legal system because “the racism endemic in the criminal legal system could
similarly infect restorative practices housed there”).
87. Roger Fairfax notes a comparable problem with a return to private prosecution. See Fairfax,
supra note 28, at 22-25. For a discussion of how abusive African-American men sometimes use “their
overrepresentation in the criminal justice system and other racial rhetoric” to excuse domestic violence
and even to persuade their intimate partners to commit crimes for them, see RICHIE, supra note 68, at
121, 129.

2022]

AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

63

victims from friends, family, and others who can help, the offender might find
group conferencing and other RJ methods more comfortable and supportive than
the abuse survivor does.88 In short, we must avoid assuming that an ideal
“community” for community-based interventions exists.
Still, the manifest shortcomings of criminal justice approaches to intimatepartner violence (and the potential for these interventions to exacerbate mass
incarceration if domestic violence offenders actually bore the full brunt of
potential penalties for their misconduct)89 make reconsideration of RJ appealing.
Several forms of RJ share the potential to validate victims’ experiences and
needs by allowing them to speak. Victims can describe the multifaceted nature
of harm they suffered and ask for resources.90 Although scholars often discuss
RJ as an alternative to the criminal legal system,91 many forms of RJ can exist in
tandem with it. This hybridity would alleviate legitimate concerns about RJ’s
weaknesses in keeping victims safe and holding offenders accountable in more
than a superficial way. Processes such as victim-offender dialogues and group
conferencing can play a role in pre- or post-conviction diversion, for example.
1. Pre-conviction Diversion to Restorative Justice
In pre-conviction diversion, the District Attorney’s office suspends
prosecution while the alleged abuser undergoes RJ. If he does not get convicted
or plead guilty, he will not have a criminal record for the offense. But, if he fails
to complete to program, his case will be referred back to the prosecutor. The
RESTORE program, described in detail below, provides community
conferencing for rape and sexual assault victims along these lines. 92 Similarly,
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa required courtapproval of written agreements reached through victim-offender conferencing;
non-compliance with terms of the agreement led to refiling of the criminal case
by the prosecutor.93
American prosecutors tend to disfavor pre-conviction diversion because
they worry that, by the time an offender’s failure to complete the required RJ
process, counseling, or substance abuse treatment is recognized, the statute of
limitations will bar prosecution for the offense.94 Another concern relates to how
self-incriminating statements made during RJ will be handled in a subsequent

88. See Kohn, supra note 9, at 547.
89. For example, although domestic violence gun bans continue to be enforced haphazardly,
more aggressive arrest and prosecution of weapons offenders would result in a large uptick in
imprisonment, disproportionately affecting black and Hispanic men. See Carolyn B. Ramsey, Firearms
in the Family, 79 OHIO ST. L. J. 1257, 1263-65, 1340-542 (2017).
90. See GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING, supra note 68, at 94-95; Burkemper & Balsam, supra
note 84, at 123-24; Coker, Enhancing Autonomy, supra note 84, at 101-02.
91. See, e.g., GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING, supra note 68, at 98-99.
92. See infra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
93. Kohn, supra note 9, at 591.
94. Hopkins, supra note 84, at 351-52.
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criminal proceeding. (Because RJ processes serve as a “safe space” for offenders
to apologize, their words should not be admissible against them.95) Opposition
to RJ and diversion has led to the enactment of statutes forbidding these
alternatives to the prosecution and punishment of domestic violence in several
states.96
But resistance can be overcome with persuasive arguments. Broadly
speaking, commentators associate the implementation of diversion programs
with “Progressive Prosecution.”97 Changing the culture and performance
evaluation criteria in District Attorney’s offices offers a key to getting line
prosecutors to adopt new approaches to intimate-partner abuse cases. Success
ought to be measured less by courtroom “wins” and “losses” than by how the
attorneys craft plea bargains, exercise discretion, show respect for the
Constitution, and evaluate the victim’s interests in relation to the public
interest.98
Prosecutors in some jurisdictions have already embraced the benefits of RJ,
in lieu of dropping cases with reluctant complainants. One of the most cited preconviction programs for adult offenders is RESTORE, which addressed sexual
assault on acquaintances—the type of case in which rape survivors often
experience “humiliation reminiscent of the original crime” if traditional
processes are used.99 RESTORE functioned in Pima County, Arizona, from
2003-2007 and was comprised of four stages: (1) referral and intake, (2)
preparation, (3) face-to-face conferencing, and (4) accountability and
reintegration.100 Referral to this federally-funded RJ program came only from
prosecutors; no self-referrals were allowed, but the “survivor victim” had to
provide informed consent before the “responsible person” was invited to
participate. Defendants who were offered a choice between RJ and “standard

95. See Donna Coker, Crime Logic, Campus Sexual Assault and Restorative Justice, 49 TEXAS
TECH. L. REV. 147, 204 (2016) (discussing MOUs between universities and prosecutors barring the use
of statements made during RJ from future use in criminal cases); Carrie Leonetti, A New Solution to an
Old Problem: Limited Use Immunity as a Better Alternative to Miranda’s Procedural Safeguard, 10
FED. CTS. L. REV. 127, 153 (2018) (arguing for the inadmissibility of soul-purging confessions).
96. Hopkins, supra note 84, at 344, 348, and n.182. See GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING, supra
note 69, at 92. The role of legislatures in prohibiting diversion in domestic violence cases supports
Jeffrey Bellin’s argument that prosecutors are just one type of actor (and not even the most powerful
one) in the criminal legal system. Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 17272, 175, 212 (2019).
97. See, e.g., EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN
PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION xxiv, 30 (2019); Angela J. Davis, Reimagining
Prosecution: A Growing Progressive Movement, 3 UCLA CRIM. JUSTICE L. REV. 1, 14, 22 (2019).
98. See David Alan Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
ONLINE 25, 30 (2017).
99. Mary P. Koss, The RESTORE Program of Restorative Justice for Sex Crimes: Vision,
Process, and Outcomes, 29 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1623, 1627-32 (2013) (quoting J.L. Herman,
Justice from the victim’s perspective, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 571, 574 (2005)). See Hopkins,
supra note 84, at 351 n.197 (confirming that RESTORE was not limited to post-conviction diversion).
100. See Koss, supra note 99, at 1627-32.
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criminal justice,” contingent on forensic assessment, might otherwise have faced
felony or misdemeanor charges.101
The conferencing stage of the RESTORE program involved a dialogue
between the survivor victim, the responsible person, and friends and family of
both parties, overseen by trained facilitators. All participants in the conference,
which took place in a “secure location,” had an opportunity to speak, and the
responsible person was asked to summarize the impact of the offense on
others.102 The conference culminated in the finalization of a redress plan
requiring sex-offender therapy and interventions, such as anger management,
that forensic assessment deemed appropriate for the responsible person. The
survivor victim could also request that community service, the payment of
financial restitution, and other activities be performed. Follow-up consisted of
regular meetings with a case manager and a Community Accountability and
Reintegration Board. The survivor victim was to be notified about the
responsible person’s progress and any reoffending.103
A peer-reviewed report on RESTORE found high levels of completion and
satisfaction. Nearly all cases in which both parties consented made it to the
conferencing stage, and among felony and misdemeanor defendants whose
conferences took place, 80 percent completed the program. Two felony
defendants were terminated for non-compliance arising from alcoholism,
homelessness, or financial problems, and another felony defendant recanted his
acceptance of responsibility and withdrew. There was only one re-arrest.104 The
preparation stage, conference, and redress plan proved satisfactory to more than
90 percent of participants. Survivor victims who attended their conferences
reported the most positive experiences (100 percent were satisfied with multiple
aspects of the program), and almost 80 percent of responsible persons were also
satisfied with RESTORE.105
Experts nevertheless caution that pre-conviction RJ may not be well-suited
to situations where the offense constitutes part of a pattern of domestic violence.
For this reason, RESTORE addressed only a narrow category of first-time sexual
assaults and excluded cases showing patterned abuse.106 The interests of safety
also required numerous modifications of standard RJ conferencing models. In
addition to being confined to prosecutor-referred cases, RESTORE incorporated
clinical risk assessment, the use of police stations for conferencing, stay-away

101. Id. at 1626-27, 1632.
102. Id. at 1630, Fig. 1 (Stage 3).
103. Id. at 1630, Fig. 1 (Stages 3-4).
104. Id. at 1647.
105. Id.
106. See C. Quince Hopkins, Mary P. Koss & Karen J. Bachar, Applying Restorative Justice to
Ongoing Intimate Violence: Problems and Possibilities, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 289, 301-02
(2004).
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orders, and 12 months of supervision to assist responsible persons with the
completion of their redress plans.107
While some progressive scholars might decry the amount of state
involvement in RJ programs like RESTORE,108 “diversion” remains a bad word
among so-called legal feminists and battered women’s advocates for a different
reason: the presumption that it lets offenders off the hook without punitive
consequences.109 Reforms that give RJ teeth by pairing it with the possibility of
criminal punishment if the offender drops out of the program or reoffends have
a greater likelihood of converting RJ skeptics than the total decriminalization of
domestic violence. RESTORE took this approach to sexual assault by referring
cases back to prosecutors when responsible parties did not complete the
conferencing stage or failed to fulfill their redress agreement. 110
As Quince Hopkins contends, “One can support the potential benefits of
diversion for first-time offenders and still support . . . enhanced penalties for
repeat offenders.”111 Moreover, since defendants must be screened for
amenability to participate in RJ, including assessment of their dangerousness and
their willingness to accept responsibility, criminal prosecution will remain
necessary for the most dangerous offenders, as well as those who claim
innocence.
2. Post-conviction Restorative Justice
Diversion to RJ increasingly requires not only oral acceptance of
responsibility, but also a formal guilty plea.112 Post-conviction diversion makes
it possible for individuals who plead guilty or are convicted to undergo an RJ
process as a probation condition or to determine their sentence.113 In a sentencing
circle, the victim, community members, and sometimes even the judge and
prosecutor, each have an opportunity to speak and determine the consequences
for the offender. The underlying principle is an agreed-upon outcome, rather than

107. Koss, supra note 99, at 1651.
108. See, e.g., Sarah Deer & Abigail Blackfoot, The Limits of the State: Feminist Perspectives on
Carceral Logic, Restorative Justice, and Sexual Violence, 28 KANSAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 505, 525
(Summer 2019) (“Perhaps the real problem is not RJ itself, but its connection to state power and control
that render it problematic.”)
109. Hopkins, supra note 84, at 316. See also Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime
and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1527 (1998) (discussing
opposition to pre-trial diversion to batterer treatment programs).
110. See GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 19, at 171.
111. See Hopkins, supra note 84, at 340.
112. See id., at 344.
113. See Burkemper & Balsam, supra note 83, at 129-32 (describing surrogate victim-offender
dialogue and circle sentencing programs that occur post-conviction as “constructs that work”).
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the retributive concept of desert.114 Sentencing circles share with batterer
treatment the objective of changing the batterer’s behavior.115
Many battered women’s advocates have given up on batterer intervention
programs (BIPs) as a tool for combatting violence against women, even though
the completion of such programs continues to be a standard component of
criminal sentences for domestic violence crimes.116 To my mind, BIPs’ lack of
success arises from failure to envision how accountability and empathy can
coexist.117 Marrying the principles of RJ and “therapeutic justice” with the
concept of batterer intervention might constitute an improvement. I suggest a
coordinated model with the ability to address substance abuse, mental illness,
past trauma, and cultural or racial background as contributors to—but not
excuses for—intimate-partner abuse.118 The remedies a sentencing circle
envisions might include multi-faceted interventions to change, rather than
restore, the status quo and give offenders a sense of being supported, rather than
merely confronted with their wrongdoing.
Judges could also sentence convicted offenders to participate in a “peace
circle” in lieu of incarceration or a conventional BIP. For example, in the
predominantly Hispanic community of Nogales, Arizona, judges and prosecutors
supported the establishment of the court-referred Circles of Peace program for
domestic violence misdemeanants.119 This path-breaking RJ approach—one of
the first used for domestic violence treatment and prevention—eschews
punishment or shaming in favor of repairing harm.120 Victim participation in the
circle is voluntary, which proponents of RJ contend it must be to avoid creating
a dangerous, coercive environment.121
114. Id. at 124; Margo Kaplan, Restorative Justice and Campus Sexual Assault, 89 TEMPLE L.
REV. 701, 714 (2017).
115. While repair and healing constitute classic RJ goals, sentencing circles can also agree upon
forward-looking measures aimed at behavioral change. See Burkemper & Balsam, supra note 83, at 132.
116. See EDWARD W. GONDOLF, THE FUTURE OF BATTERER PROGRAMS 1 (2012).
117. See Ramsey, The Stereotyped Offender, supra note 48, at 338, 363-69, 378-84, 415
(discussing the curriculum and shortcomings of the leading feminist model of batterer intervention, the
Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project, and arguing that stereotyping all offenders as
misogynistic, heterosexual men obscures contextual factors that BIPs need to address).
118. See Ramsey, The Stereotyped Offender, supra note 48, at 384-414. See also John O. Haley,
Introduction: Beyond Retribution: An Integrated Approach to Restorative Justice, 36 WASH. UNIV. J.L.
& POL’Y 1, 6 (2011) (discussing therapeutic justice, especially the drug court model, and its relationship
to RJ). Hybrids that combine RJ circles and Duluth-style BIPs have already halved recidivism compared
to BIPs alone in one randomized study. See Linda G. Mills, Briana Barocas B, Robert P. Butters &
Barak Ariel, A randomized controlled trial of restorative justice-informed treatment for domestic
violence crimes, 3 NAT. HUM. BEHAV.1284, 1290 (2019).
119. Linda G. Mills, Mary Helen Maley, & Yael Shy, Circulos de Paz and the Promise of Peace,
Restorative Justice Meets Intimate Violence, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 127, 136, 145, 147
(2009).
120. “Circle Model Process” and “Frequently Asked Questions,” Circles of Peace: A Restorative
Justice Approach, available at https://www.circlesofpeace.us/?page_id=58 and https://perma.cc/4EDRB8UD (last visited July 27, 2022).
121. See Burkemper & Balsam, supra note 83, at 125; Mills, Maley, & Shy, supra note 119, at
149. In a randomized controlled trial of Circles of Peace in Nogales, Arizona, 62 percent of victims
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From its inception in 2004, Circles of Peace remained “closely connected
to the criminal justice system and to the state” and involved substantial oversight
by a judge.122 Not only does this model call for offenders, euphemistically known
as “applicants,” to be screened for safety, but those who “are non-compliant with
the program—or . . . do not meet drug treatment or service requirements that are
part of the social compact—[receive] an ‘Order to Show Cause’ to appear in
court to tell the judge why they have not complied with the treatment. If they fail
to appear, a new charge of ‘Failure to Obey’ is lodged by the prosecutor and a
warrant is issued.”123 In other words, the criminal justice system plays a back-up
role to ensure offender accountability in this form of post-conviction diversion.
Data on the efficacy of Circles of Peace remains sparse. Reports of
satisfaction by members of the pilot circles in 2005 helped the program expand,
become a non-profit organization, and obtain a license from the state of Arizona
to provide batterer treatment.124 Yet a randomized clinical trial comparing
Circles of Peace in Nogales to a local BIP found no statistically significant
difference in terms of arrest recidivism for domestic violence.125 A subsequent
trial in Salt Lake City, Utah, produced more impressive data on the success of
the Circles of Peace model. This study, like the one in Arizona, involved
participants who had been convicted of domestic violence crimes. Under Utah’s
state standards, all offenders had to complete an 18-week BIP; in addition, the
experimental group participated in 6 weeks of circle sessions. The Utah study
found “statistically significant and meaningful reductions of recidivism for all
crimes, including DV” for offenders assigned to a hybrid “BIP-plus-CP” in
contrast to those assigned only to a BIP. These results supported the conclusion
that “BIP-plus-CP” reduced the incidence and severity of new crimes.126
Another promising model of RJ that can be implemented after the
offender’s conviction—the surrogate victim-offender dialogue (SVOD)—is
well-designed to avoid the manipulation of abuse survivors by their assailants.
The SVOD requires a convicted person to converse with individuals who
suffered similar crimes to those he committed without risking interaction with
his actual victim.127 SVODs, circles, and other RJ processes can be paired with
a variety of criminal penalties, including imprisonment, and have even been used

participated in at least one treatment session with offenders. Linda G. Mills, Briana Barocas & Barak
Ariel. The next generation of court-mandated domestic violence treatment: a comparison study of
Batterer Intervention and Restorative Justice Programs, 9 J. EXP. CRIMINOLOGY. 65, 78 (2013).
122. Mills, Maley & Shy, supra note 119, at 147.
123. Id. at 149-50.
124. Id. at 148.
125. Mills, Barocas & Ariel, supra note 121, at 83-84.
126. Id. at 1290.
127. See Burkemper & Balsam, supra note 83, at 129-30. The RESTORE program for sexual
assault cases also offered survivors the option of designating a surrogate victim to attend conferences as
their spokesperson, give an impact statement, and participate in drafting the redress agreement. Koss,
supra note 99, at 1632.
127. See Burkemper & Balsam, supra note 83, at 129.
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in prison settings to help homicide offenders understand the impact of the
victim’s violent death on surviving family members.128 In a recent New York
case, acceptance of responsibility and participation in an RJ circle by a robber
whose victim died trying to resist him allowed the assailant to serve a shorter
prison term than he otherwise would have faced.129 Even more important to the
goal of reducing the system’s reliance on imprisonment, first-time offenders in
non-fatal domestic violence cases can undergo RJ methods designed to induce
empathy and healing in lieu of carceral outcomes. The use of surrogates makes
this possible without lifting restraining orders, which promotes both survivor
safety and the avoidance of imprisonment as a go-to penalty for the batterer.
RJ programs like these have shown success in terms of domestic violence
victims’ satisfaction, batterers’ understanding of the harm, and a reduction in
minimizing or transferring responsibility for violence to the victim. Though hard
data is sparse, the effect on recidivism also seems promising. 130 But what if an
offender doesn’t comply and even escalates the abuse in a life-threatening
manner? Concerns about enforcement make me skeptical of community-based
transformative justice proposals that completely eschew police, prosecutors, and
punishment for violent crime.
CONCLUSION
Serving the interests of domestic violence survivors, including their
personal autonomy, need not eclipse safety and accountability as valid and
achievable goals. Nor does the use of RJ within the criminal legal system require
the “reprivatization” of domestic violence—if, by that term, we refer to the
supposed refusal of the patriarchal state to address abuse occurring behind a veil
of privacy.131 As my forthcoming book will show,132 both the veil of marital
128. See Adriaan Lanni, Taking Restorative Justice Seriously, 69 BUFFALO L. REV. 635, 650-51
(2021).
129. See Sabrina Margret Bierer, Bettering Prosecutorial Engagement to Reduce Crime,
Prosecutions, and the Criminal Justice Footprint, 32 FED. SENTENCING R. 212, 216 (2020) (discussing
the use of an RJ circle with the family of a deceased doctor as part of the criminal sentence for the
offender who caused his death).
130. See Burkemper & Balsam, supra note 83, at 130-33.
131. See GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 19, at 170-71 (discussing the
reasons, including concern about re-privatization, that the Battered Women’s Movement has
overwhelmingly opposed RJ in domestic violence cases); GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING, supra note
68, at 192-94 (similar). For a much-cited argument that, in the late 1800s, a veil of marital privacy
shielded perpetrators, especially affluent white men, from prosecution for domestic violence, see Siegel,
supra note 57, at 2118-19, 2151-63, 2206. Other scholars who have relied on Siegel’s article or made
similar claims of their own include ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST
LAWMAKING 13, 233 n.4 (2000); JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW 13 (2009); Kimberly D.
Bailey, It’s Complicated: Privacy and Domestic Violence, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1777, 1778 (2012);
Beverly Balos, A Man’s Home is His Castle: How the Law Shelters Domestic Violence and Sexual
Harassment, 23 ST. LOUIS UNIV. PUBLIC L. REV. 77, 87-90 (2004); Emily J. Sack, Battered Women
and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1662,
1662 n.15, 1666 (2004).
132. RAMSEY, HOUSES OF PAIN, supra note 7.
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privacy and the unwillingness of the criminal legal system to address domestic
violence have been exaggerated to the level of myth.
Besides the inter-spousal immunity doctrine in tort and the marital rape
exemption in criminal law,133 there have been few moments during the last 150
years of American history in which the state saw domestic violence as a purely
private matter. Only in the middle decades of the twentieth century did criminal
law personnel widely deem counseling and reconciliation preferable to the
prosecution of batterers. Arrest avoidance and non-prosecution were a phase to
which second-wave feminists reacted, but not a centuries-old practice of the
patriarchal state. To be sure, judges and prosecutors in the 1800s and early 1900s
often deferred to the constrained choice of abused women to drop their cases.
But wife-beating was widely denounced, and criminal convictions resulted in
fines and jail sentences.
My objective is not to endorse the old ad hoc approach to public
prosecution of batterers—simply to point out that it had a long history and that
there are costs to oversimplifying the complexities of the past. Indeed, the
criminal legal system’s intervention in domestic violence both before and after
the Battered Women’s Movement was ineffective because its punishments failed
to deter and because it did not offer adequate support for abuse victims. To the
extent that Capers’ proposal is inspired instead by the private prosecutions
common in colonial America and the early republic, he encourages lively debate.
His invitation to imagine how justice might be achieved without public
prosecutors may spark creative ideas for reform. In the context of domestic
violence, it is a welcome suggestion—but not one for which the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries offer easy answers.
The key to the state’s ineffective response to domestic violence in the past
lay in structural barriers to women’s independence from abusive men. As long
as those barriers persisted, no effort by criminal justice personnel to end domestic
violence had much likelihood of success. Giving abused women the choice to
pursue an assault and battery case or decline to prosecute the alleged offender
when they lacked meaningful ability to end their intimate relationship, or
leverage better treatment within it, meant that many simply asked for the criminal
charges to be dismissed.
Even today, deciding whether and how to prosecute batterers comprises
only a small part of the puzzle of addressing the wrong of domestic violence
without further harming its victims. Survivors of abuse should be offered more
input in the criminal process, including RJ options, as well as tools to find safety
and socioeconomic stability outside it. But, in my view, eliminating public
prosecution of domestic violence holds little promise to remedy this grave

133. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF.
L. REV. 1373, 1375-78 (2000); Katz, supra note 45 at 385-85.

2022]

AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

71

societal harm, end the abuse of individual victims, or substantially curb mass
incarceration.

